In this paper, we look at applying the techniques from analyzing superintuitionistic logics to extensions of the cointuitionistic Priest-da Costa logic daC (introduced by Graham Priest as “da Costa logic”). The relationship between the superintuitionistic axioms- definable in daC- and extensions of Priest-da Costa logic (sdc-logics) is analyzed and applied to exploring the gap between the maximal si-logic SmL and classical logic in the class of sdc-logics. A sequence of strengthenings of Priest-da Costa logic is examined and employed to pinpoint (...) the maximal non-classical extension of both daC and Heyting-Brouwer logic HB . Finally, the relationship between daC and Logics of Formal Inconsistency is examined. (shrink)

In this paper, we examine a number of relevant logics’ variable sharing properties from the perspective of theories of topic or subject-matter. We take cues from Franz Berto’s recent work on topic to show an alignment between families of variable sharing properties and responses to the topic transparency of relevant implication and negation. We then introduce and defend novel variable sharing properties stronger than strong depth relevance—which we call cn-relevance and lossless cn-relevance—showing that the properties are satisfied by the weak (...) relevant logics and , respectively. We argue that such properties address a sort of semantic lossiness of strong depth relevance. (shrink)

We here make preliminary investigations into the model theory of DeMorgan logics. We demonstrate that Łoś's Theorem holds with respect to these logics and make some remarks about standard model-theoretic properties in such contexts. More concretely, as a case study we examine the fate of Cantor's Theorem that the classical theory of dense linear orderings without endpoints is $\aleph_{0}$-categorical, and we show that the taking of ultraproducts commutes with respect to previously established methods of constructing nonclassical structures, namely, Priest's Collapsing (...) Lemma and Dunn's Theorem in 3-Valued Logic. (shrink)

In this article we revisit a number of disputes regarding significance logics---i.e., inferential frameworks capable of handling meaningless, although grammatical, sentences---that took place in a series of articles most of which appeared in the Australasian Journal of Philosophy between 1966 and 1978. These debates concern (i) the way in which logical consequence ought to be approached in the context of a significance logic, and (ii) the way in which the logical vocabulary has to be modified (either by restricting some notions, (...) or by adding some vocabulary) to keep as much of Classical Logic as possible. Our aim is to show that the divisions arising from these disputes can be dissolved in the context of a novel and intuitive proposal that we put forward. (shrink)

A wide family of many-valued logics—for instance, those based on the weak Kleene algebra—includes a non-classical truth-value that is ‘contaminating’ in the sense that whenever the value is assigned to a formula φ⁠, any complex formula in which φ appears is assigned that value as well. In such systems, the contaminating value enjoys a wide range of interpretations, suggesting scenarios in which more than one of these interpretations are called for. This calls for an evaluation of systems with multiple contaminating (...) values. In this paper, we consider the countably infinite family of multiple-conclusion consequence relations in which classical logic is enriched with one or more contaminating values whose behavior is determined by a linear ordering between them. We consider some motivations and applications for such systems and provide general characterizations for all consequence relations in this family. Finally, we provide sequent calculi for a pair of four-valued logics including two linearly ordered contaminating values before defining two-sided sequent calculi corresponding to each of the infinite family of many-valued logics studied in this paper. (shrink)

Logics based on weak Kleene algebra (WKA) and related structures have been recently proposed as a tool for reasoning about flaws in computer programs. The key element of this proposal is the presence, in WKA and related structures, of a non-classical truth-value that is “contaminating” in the sense that whenever the value is assigned to a formula ϕ, any complex formula in which ϕ appears is assigned that value as well. Under such interpretations, the contaminating states represent occurrences of a (...) flaw. However, since different programs and machines can interact with (or be nested into) one another, we need to account for different kind of errors, and this calls for an evaluation of systems with multiple contaminating values. In this paper, we make steps toward these evaluation systems by considering two logics, HYB1 and HYB2, whose semantic interpretations account for two contaminating values beside classical values 0 and 1. In particular, we provide two main formal contributions. First, we give a characterization of their relations of (multiple-conclusion) logical consequence—that is, necessary and sufficient conditions for a set Δ of formulas to logically follow from a set Γ of formulas in HYB1 or HYB2 . Second, we provide sound and complete sequent calculi for the two logics. (shrink)

This paper discusses three relevant logics that obey Component Homogeneity - a principle that Goddard and Routley introduce in their project of a logic of significance. The paper establishes two main results. First, it establishes a general characterization result for two families of logic that obey Component Homogeneity - that is, we provide a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for their consequence relations. From this, we derive characterization results for S*fde, dS*fde, crossS*fde. Second, the paper establishes complete sequent calculi (...) for S*fde, dS*fde, crossS*fde. Among the other accomplishments of the paper, we generalize the semantics from Bochvar, Hallden, Deutsch and Daniels, we provide a general recipe to define containment logics, we explore the single-premise/single-conclusion fragment of S*fde, dS*fde, crossS*fdeand the connections between crossS*fde and the logic Eq of equality by Epstein. Also, we present S*fde as a relevant logic of meaninglessness that follows the main philosophical tenets of Goddard and Routley, and we briefly examine three further systems that are closely related to our main logics. Finally, we discuss Routley's criticism to containment logic in light of our results, and overview some open issues. (shrink)

Incompatibilists believe free will is impossible if determinism is true, and they often claim that this view is supported by ordinary intuitions. We challenge the claim that incompatibilism is intuitive to most laypersons and discuss the significance of this challenge to the free will debate. After explaining why incompatibilists should want their view to accord with pretheoretical intuitions, we suggest that determining whether incompatibilism is in fact intuitive calls for empirical testing. We then present the results of our studies, which (...) put significant pressure on the claim that incompatibilism is intuitive. Finally, we consider and respond to several potential objections to our approach. (shrink)

Many traditional theists maintain that God is the ultimate explanation of the universe, for why anything exists at all. For the traditional theist, only a being who is fundamental and transcendent can provide an ultimate ground and explanation of the universe. This requirement that God transcend the universe in order to ultimately explain it poses a challenge for pantheism, the view that God is numerically identical with the universe. If God is identical with the universe, and God is supposed to (...) be the ultimate explanation of the universe, the result is an instance of circular explanation. And circular explanations are allegedly illegitimate. In this article, I develop two explanatory models in an attempt to show that pantheism is consistent with non-circular explanations of the universe. All else being equal, I argue that pantheism is not explanatorily deficient in comparison to traditional theism. (shrink)

This document presents the Bonn PRINTEGER Consensus Statement: Working with Research Integrity—Guidance for research performing organisations. The aim of the statement is to complement existing instruments by focusing specifically on institutional responsibilities for strengthening integrity. It takes into account the daily challenges and organisational contexts of most researchers. The statement intends to make research integrity challenges recognisable from the work-floor perspective, providing concrete advice on organisational measures to strengthen integrity. The statement, which was concluded February 7th 2018, provides guidance on (...) the following key issues: § 1.Providing information about research integrity § 2.Providing education, training and mentoring § 3.Strengthening a research integrity culture § 4.Facilitating open dialogue § 5.Wise incentive management § 6.Implementing quality assurance procedures § 7.Improving the work environment and work satisfaction § 8.Increasing transparency of misconduct cases § 9.Opening up research § 10.Implementing safe and effective whistle-blowing channels § 11.Protecting the alleged perpetrators § 12.Establishing a research integrity committee and appointing an ombudsperson § 13.Making explicit the applicable standards for research integrity. (shrink)

Despite overlooking religious topics, Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations (PI) has had a large impact in philosophy of religion. This article surveys that influence and the reasons for it. In what follows, I first describe the reception of certain key concepts from the PI in philosophy of religion. Second, I examine a few scattered remarks on religious topics in the PI. Third, I consider the relevance of the PI for contemporary philosophy of religion. I argue that the dialogical nature of the PI, (...) allowing different generations of readers to engage it with their particular philosophical problems, is key to its longterm influence. (shrink)

Un fait Mooréen, selon l'expression de David Lewis, est « l'une des choses que nous savons mieux que toute prémisse d'une argumentation philosophique visant à é tablir le contraire. » Le sujet des faits Mooréens soulève des questions profondes, à la fois de méthode philosophique et d'épistémologie de premier ordre. Comment devrions-nous répondre aux arguments qui remettent en question des croyances dont nous sommes extrêmement confiants ? Dans quelle mesure ces arguments – ou plutôt ceux qui les avancent – peuvent-ils (...) espérer avoir une emprise ou une traction rationnelle sur nous ? Dans quelle mesure, si même c'est le cas, notre point de départ limite-t-il les types de révisions de nos croyances que la philosophie pourrait légitimement inspirer ? Quand sommes-nous justifiés (si jamais nous le sommes) à refuser de se laisser influencer par un argument qui, pour autant qu'on puisse en juger, est sans faille, et quand un tel refus relève-t-il simplement du dogmatisme ? Ce sont là de vastes questions, auxquelles je ne tenterai pas ici de répondre complétement. Mon ambition, plus modeste, est de tenter de progresser sur ces questions, et d'autres questions connexes, en examinant la notion de fait Mooré que je trouve chez Lewis et chez d'autres. (shrink)

Amazon Book Review Series of “Meandering Sobriety”.

Every day, thousands of polls, surveys, and rating scales are employed to elicit the attitudes of humankind. Given the ubiquitous use of these instruments, it seems we ought to have firm answers to what is measured by them, but unfortunately we do not. To help remedy this situation, we present a novel approach to investigate the nature of attitudes. We created a self-transforming paper survey of moral opinions, covering both foundational principles, and current dilemmas hotly debated in the media. This (...) survey used a magic trick to expose participants to a reversal of their previously stated attitudes, allowing us to record whether they were prepared to endorse and argue for the opposite view of what they had stated only moments ago. The result showed that the majority of the reversals remained undetected, and a full 69% of the participants failed to detect at least one of two changes. In addition, participants often constructed coherent and unequivocal arguments supporting the opposite of their original position. These results suggest a dramatic potential for flexibility in our moral attitudes, and indicates a clear role for self-attribution and post-hoc rationalization in attitude formation and change. (shrink)

Concerns around Generative Artificial Intelligence (GenAI) in higher education have so far largely centred on assessment integrity, resulting in fundamental questions about students’ broader engagement with these tools remaining underexplored. This paper reports on the findings of a survey that forms part of a wider study, comprising the first empirical investigation of GenAI use by university students as a method of engaging with their academic readings. Our survey of 101 students shows that over half of all students surveyed used GenAI (...) to some degree as a method of engaging with their unit readings. Our findings suggest that students turn to these tools in response to time constraints and conceptual difficulties, while maintaining complex attitudes toward their use: most welcome their availability, yet few report trusting or relying on GenAI-generated interpretations or summaries of texts. Importantly, our data reveals substantial demographic variations in usage patterns, with international students and those taking subjects as electives showing significantly higher rates of AI use to assist with reading. This suggests GenAI tools may be serving as important mediators for attempting to overcome epistemic barriers to learning, particularly for students who face additional linguistic or disciplinary challenges. (shrink)

Tradução do verbete "Democracy", publicado por Thomas Christiano na Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, acrescida de um apêndice.

Recent scholarship in intellectual humility (IH) has attempted to provide deeper understanding of the virtue as personality trait and its impact on an individual's thoughts, beliefs, and actions. A limitations-owning perspective of IH focuses on a proper recognition of the impact of intellectual limitations and a motivation to overcome them, placing it as the mean between intellectual arrogance and intellectual servility. We developed the Limitations-Owning Intellectual Humility Scale to assess this conception of IH with related personality constructs. In Studies 1 (...) (n= 386) and 2 (n = 296), principal factor and confirmatory factor analyses revealed a three-factor model – owning one's intellectual limitations, appropriate discomfort with intellectual limitations, and love of learning. Study 3 (n = 322) demonstrated strong test-retest reliability of the measure over 5 months, while Study 4 (n = 612) revealed limitations-owning IH correlated negatively with dogmatism, closed-mindedness, and hubristic pride and positively with openness, assertiveness, authentic pride. It also predicted openness and closed-mindedness over and above education, social desirability, and other measures of IH. The limitations-owning understanding of IH and scale allow for a more nuanced, spectrum interpretation and measurement of the virtue, which directs future study inside and outside of psychology. (shrink)

Felix Klein and Abraham Fraenkel each formulated a criterion for a theory of infinitesimals to be successful, in terms of the feasibility of implementation of the Mean Value Theorem. We explore the evolution of the idea over the past century, and the role of Abraham Robinson's framework therein.

The work of Thomas White represents a systematic attempt to combine the best of the new science of the seventeenth century with the best of Aristotelian tradition. This attempt earned him the criticism of Hobbes and the praise of Leibniz, but today, most of his attempts to navigate between traditions remain to be explored in detail. This paper does so for his ontology of accidents. It argues that his criticism of accidents in the category of location as entities over (...) and above substances was likely aimed at Francisco Suárez, and shows how White’s worries about the analysis of location were linked with his broader cosmological views. White rejects real qualities, but holds that the quantity of a substance is somehow distinct from its bearer. This reveals a common ground with some of his scholastic interlocutors, but lays bare a deep disagreement with thinkers like Descartes on the nature of matter. (shrink)

Drugs used to provide improvement of cognitive functioning have been shown to be effective in healthy individuals. It is sometimes assumed that the use of these drugs constitutes cheating in an academic context. We examine whether this assumption is ethically sound. Beyond providing the most up-to-date discussion of modafinil use in an academic context, this contribution includes an overview of the safety of modafinil use in greater depth than previous studies addressing the issue of cheating. Secondly, we emphasize two crucial, (...) but hitherto nearly overlooked, nuances to the issues: the potential for modafinil to decrease inequality and disadvantage in academic settings, and the fact that how modafinil is used dramatically impacts its effects on health, coercion, fairness, authenticity and effort. Finally, we explicitly defend the position that there are no qualitatively morally relevant differences between modafinil use and other enhancement modalities; any such differences are in degree,... (shrink)

Although they were never to meet and corresponded only briefly, Catharine Macaulay and Mary Wollstonecraft shared a mutual admiration and a strong intellectual bond. Macaulay’s work had a profound and lasting effect on Wollstonecraft, and she developed and expanded on many of Macaulay’s ideas. While she often took these in a different direction, there remains a great synergy between their ideas to the extent that we can understand Wollstonecraft’s own feminist arguments by approaching them through the frameworks (...) and ideas that Macaulay provided. These included the principles of classical republicanism, particularly in its understanding of the values of freedom, equality and virtue, and an understanding of reason as grounded in immutable principles that apply equally to both sexes. On the question of women’s freedom and social equality with men, I argue that though Macaulay sets up the problem in far richer and more detailed philosophical terms, in the end it is Wollstonecraft that has the more compelling account of its far-reaching social implications and of how this might be addressed. (shrink)

Summary: Edward Lanphier and colleagues contend that human germline editing is an unethical technology because it could have unpredictable effects on future generations. In our view, such misgivings do not justify their proposed moratorium.

Pe tradición filosófica umi enfoque moral rehegua oñemopyenda predominantemente umi concepto ha teoría metafísica ha teológica-pe. Umi concepto tradicional ética rehegua apytépe, ojehecharamovéva ha’e Teoría de Comando Divino (TCD). TCD he’iháicha, Ñandejára ome’ẽ pyenda moral yvypórape ojejapo guive ha umi revelación rupive. Péicha, pe moralidad ha divinidad ndojeseparái va’erãmo’ã pe civilización mombyryvéva guive. Ko'ã concepto oime sumergido peteî estructura teológica ha oasepta principalmente mayoría umi omoirûva mbohapy tradición abrahámica: judaísmo, cristianismo ha islam, oimehápe parte considerable población humana. Oñongatúvo jerovia ha (...) Apocalipsis ifundamento ramo, umi Teorías de Mando Divino noĩri estrictamente sujeto mba’eveichagua tipo de demostración-pe. Umi opositor concepción moral Comando Divino rehegua, oñemopyendáva imposibilidad ohechauka haĝua umi suposición metafísica ha religiosa orekóva, oñeha’ã heta siglo aja odevalorávo importancia orekóva. Oipytyvõ hikuái argumento teoría ndohechaukái evidencia material ha coherencia lógica ha, péva rehe, ndikatúi ojeguereko en cuenta propósito científico térã filosófico. Pe entendimiento moral oikotevẽ peteĩ percepción ha acuerdo tuichavéva umi filósofo apytépe, araka’eve ndohupytýiva hikuái. Universo ha atmósfera ojeréva ko estudio rehe ha'e umi dominio opavave ko'ã conflicto conceptual, ojehecháva punto de vista objetivo ha evolutivo. Taha'e ha'éva ko circunstancia ha importancia intrínseca orekóva, ko'ã porandu mombyry eterei enfoque metodológico peteî discusión analítica moralidad objetiva rehe, ha'éva, añetehápe, objetivo ha alcance ko tembiapo. Jahecha jeyva’erã mbykymi ko’ã teoría tradicional iñimportánteva, ko investigación ha’égui peteĩ estudio comparativo, ha umi suposición orekóva por lo menos tuicha iñambue opaite teoría tradicional-gui. Upévare oñeikotevê oñeikuave'ê moñe'êhárape, ko texto-pe, elemento directo ha específico ombojojáva crítica válida-pe guarã, odispensávo investigación interruptiva. Ha katu, jepe jahecha jey umi teoría tradicional, upevarã exposición comparativa ha crítica, oñeñongatúta ñande preocupación principal ykére, ha'eháicha "aliena materia". Hembipotápe ore estudio ohechauka ha ohustifika existencia ha significado arquetipo moral prehistórico heñóiva directamente principio fundamental, tekotevê social ha ñeha'ã sobrevivencia rehe. Ko'ã arquetipo ha'e definición fundamento esencial ética, agregación orekóva organización lógica colectiva inconsciente ha correspondiente ha transmisión umi etapa evolutiva genoma humano ha umi relación espacio-tiempo iñambuéva, independientemente oimeraê experiencia contemporánea umi tapicha. Ko sistema odefiníva ko'ã arquetipo omoheñói modelo social humano evolutivo. Ko razonamiento he'ise pe moralidad ha'eha peteî atributo primario "homo sapiens" rehegua; ndaha’éi peteĩ mba’e ni peteĩ accidente: ombojoaju yvypóra esencia ha oike yvypóra identidad ontológica reino-pe. Pe fenómeno yvypóra ha’e peteĩ proceso continuo, omboguatáva ifunción determinación aleatoria ha libre albedrío apytépe, ha tekotevẽ ñacuestiona mba’éichapa oñepyrũ pe moralidad ha mba’éichapa ou ñandéve ko’áĝa. -/- A tradição filosófica das abordagens da moral tem predominantemente como base conceitos e teorias metafísicas e teológicas. Entre os conceitos tradicionais de ética, o mais proeminente é a Teoria do Comando Divino (TCD). De acordo com a TCD, Deus dá fundamentos morais à humanidade desde sua criação e por meio de revelações. Assim, moralidade e divindade seriam inseparáveis desde a civilização mais remota. Esses conceitos submergem em uma estrutura teológica e são principalmente aceitos pela maioria dos seguidores das três tradições Abraâmicas: judaísmo, cristianismo e islamismo, abrangendo a parte mais considerável da população humana. Mantendo a fé e a Revelação como seus fundamentos, as Teorias do Comando Divino não estão estritamente sujeitas a qualquer tipo de demonstração. Os oponentes da concepção moral do Comando Divino, fundamentados na impossibilidade de demonstrar suas suposições metafísicas e religiosas, tentam há muitos séculos (embora sem sucesso) desvalorizar sua importância. Eles sustentam o argumento de que a teoria não mostra evidências materiais e coerência lógica e, por esse motivo, não pode ser levada em consideração para fins científicos ou filosóficos. É apenas uma crença e, como tal, deve ser entendida. Além dessas oposições extremas, muitos outros conceitos atacam as teorias do Comando Divino, de uma ou de outra maneira, em parte ou na totalidade. Muitos filósofos e cientistas sociais, da clássica filosofia grega até a presente data, por exemplo, sustentam que a moralidade é apenas uma construção e, portanto, culturalmente relativa e culturalmente determinada. No entanto, isso traz muitas outras discussões e impõe o desafio de determinar qual é o significado da cultura, quais elementos da cultura são moralmente determinantes e, finalmente, quais são os limites dessa relatividade. Os deterministas morais, por sua vez, afirmam que tudo relacionado ao comportamento humano, incluindo a moralidade, é determinado em suas causas, uma vez que o livre-arbítrio não existe. Mais recentemente, os pensadores modernos argumentaram que existe uma rigorosa ciência da moralidade. No entanto, o método científico por si só, apesar de explicar vários fatos e evidências, não pode esclarecer todo o conteúdo e todo o significado da ética. A compreensão moral exige uma percepção mais ampla e um acordo entre os filósofos, que eles nunca alcançaram. Todas essas perguntas têm muitas configurações diferentes, dependendo de cada linha filosófica, e iniciam análises complexas e debates intermináveis, uma vez que muitas delas são reciprocamente conflitantes. O universo e a atmosfera envolvendo esta estudo são os domínios de todos esses conflitos conceptuais, observados de um ponto de vista objetivo e evolutivo. Independentemente dessa circunstância e de sua importância intrínseca, essas questões estão muito distantes da abordagem metodológica de uma discussão analítica sobre a moral objetiva, a qual é, de fato, o objetivo e o escopo deste trabalho. Devemos revisitar brevemente essas importantes teorias tradicionais, porque esta pesquisa abriga um estudo comparativo, e suas suposições pelo menos diferem profundamente de todas as teorias tradicionais. Portanto, torna-se necessário oferecer ao leitor, neste texto, elementos diretos e específicos de comparação para críticas válidas, dispensando pesquisas interruptivas. No entanto, mesmo revisitando as teorias tradicionais, para esse objetivo de exposição comparativa e crítica, elas serão mantidas ao lado de nossas principais preocupações, como " aliena materia ". Independentemente da validade de qualquer um ou de todos os elementos dessa discussão e de seu significado como universo filosófico deste trabalho, o objetivo do nosso estudo é demonstrar e justificar a existência e o significado de arquétipos morais pré-históricos surgidos diretamente dos princípios fundamentais, necessidades sociais e esforços para a sobrevivência. (shrink)

Is it possible for an individual that has gone out of being to come back into being again? The English Aristotelian, Thomas White, argued that it is not. Thomas Hobbes disagreed, and used the case of the Ship of Theseus to argue that individuals that have gone out of being may come back into being again. This paper provides the first systematic account of their arguments. It is doubtful that Hobbes has a consistent case against White. Still his (...) criticism may have prompted White to clarify his views on identity over time in his later work. (shrink)

Verificationism has had a bad press for many years. The view that the meaning of our words is bound up with the discernible difference it would make if what we say, think or write were true or false, nowadays is scorned as “positivist” though it was shared by eminent empiricists and pragmatists. This paper seeks to sort through some of the complexities of what is often portrayed as an unduly simplistic conception. I begin with an overview of its main logical (...) empiricist varieties before considering which aspects of it fall victim to which of the three major types of objection that have been raised against it. I will conclude that what is left standing is a modest proposal that seems worth further investigation. (shrink)

According to Rainer Forst, (i) moral and political claims must meet a requirement of reciprocal and general acceptability (RGA) while (ii) we are under a duty in engaged discursive practice to justify such claims to others, or be able to do so, on grounds that meet RGA. The paper critically engages this view. I argue that Forst builds a key component of RGA, i.e., reciprocity of reasons, on an idea of the reasonable that undermines both (i) and (ii): if RGA (...) builds on this idea, RGA is viciously regressive and a duty of justification to meet RGA fails to be agent transparent. This negative result opens the door for alternative conceptions of reciprocity and generality. I then suggest that a more promising conception of reciprocity and generality needs to build on an idea of the reasonable that helps to reconcile the emancipatory or protective aspirations of reciprocal and general justification with its egalitarian commitments. But this requires to downgrade RGA in the order of justification and to determine on prior, substantive grounds what level of discursive influence in reciprocal and general justification relevant agents ought to have. (shrink)

This paper argues that we find a double deduction of the origin of society in Spinoza’s philosophy. The site of this doubleness is in E4p37, where Spinoza offers two distinct demonstrations for the same phenomenon. Paying close attention to this double articulation highlights important features of Spinozian social and political philosophy. As Étienne Balibar noted, the two demonstrations operate according to two dimensions of human existence, namely rationality and affectivity. Through rationality, human beings are necessarily in harmony; through affectivity, human (...) beings are in an ambivalent relationship towards one another. The root of this ambivalence, Balibar argued, is the structure of imitation that rules human interactions. Accordingly, the task of politics is to avoid the inimical tendencies of the said ambivalence through artful strategies. In this paper, I aim to sharpen Balibar’s reading by proposing a reading of E4p37 that focuses on a little-discussed distinction between commonality and similarity. This distinction bleeds into social life and becomes the difference between the apolitical community of friends and the political society of citizens. In other words, through a close re-reading of E4p37 that puts it in relation with Spinoza’s political works, I argue that rationality cultivates harmony under the guise of friendship, while politics is an art that shapes the category of the similar, thus drawing the contour of the fellow-citizen. Hence, politics seeks to imitate friendship, and it can only do so by shaping our judgement concerning the similarity of the other. (shrink)

Principles of procreative beneficence (PPBs) hold that parents have good reasons to select the child with the best life prospects. Sparrow (2010) claims that PPBs imply that we should select only female children, unlesswe attach normative significance to “normal” human capacities. We argue that this claim fails on both empirical and logical grounds. Empirically, Sparrow’s argument for greater female wellbeing rests on a selective reading of the evidence and the incorrect assumption that an advantage for females would persist even when (...) a serious gender imbalance is obtained. Logically, PPBs cite only pro tanto reasons and allow that the good of an individual child could be outweighed by other morally relevant considerations, such as those which take collectively suboptimal outcomes into account. There is thus no need to attach value to the “normal.”. (shrink)

While several tests and strategies are recommended for colorectal cancer (CRC) screening, studies suggest that primary care providers often recommend colonoscopy without providing information about its risks or alternatives. These observations raise concerns about the quality of informed consent for screening colonoscopy.

This paper summarizes (in German) recent tendencies in the philosophy of the life sciences.

GILBERT JEAN FACCARELLO (Paris, 1950) is professor of economics at Université Panthéon-Assas, Paris, and a member of the Triangle research centre (École Normale Supérieure de Lyon and CNRS). He is presently chair of the ESHET Council (European Society for the History of Economic Thought). He completed his doctoral research in economics at Université de Paris X Nanterre. He has previously taught at the Université de Paris-Dauphine, Université du Maine and École Normale Supérieure de Fontenay/Saint-Cloud (now École Normale Supérieure de Lyon). (...) He is a co-founder of The European Journal of the History of Economic Thought, which he co-edited for 20 years with J. L. Cardoso, Heinz D. Kurz, and A. Murphy. With Alain Béraud, he edited the Nouvelle histoire de la pensée économique (La Découverte, 3 volumes, 1992-2000) and, together with Heinz D. Kurz, he is presently editing a Handbook of the History of Economic Analysis (3 volumes, forthcoming with Edward Elgar). -/- EJPE interviewed Gilbert Faccarello about his research career in the history of economic thought, where he has focused especially on old and new classical and Marxian political economy, and French political economy during the 18th and 19th centuries. G. Faccarello discusses his interest not only in the logical structure and context of the economic ideas of past thinkers but also the links between economic thought, philosophy, and religion. (shrink)

Introduction to the Inaugural Issue of the Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics.

In the wake of the non-ideal theory turn in political philosophy, few have paused to ask: Is non-ideal theory a form of ideology? And perhaps even fewer have paused to ask: Is the debate between ideal/non-ideal theorists itself a form of ideology? To the first question, I argue that non-ideal theory is ideological in virtue of the fact that it rules out more utopian ways of theorizing by methodological fiat, and in so doing, risks entrenching an unjust status quo. To (...) the second question, I argue that the debate between ideal/non-ideal theorists is itself a form of ideology, one which serves to reinforce the status quo by convincing political philosophers/theorists that the most pressing problems are problems about what we should think about what we are doing. But this is false. An upshot of my argument is that we ought to abandon the ideal/non-ideal theory debate and address the pressing problems of political philosophy head-on in pluralist fashion, oscillating back and forth between these two modes of theorizing without a decision procedure to tell us when we should take up one perspective or the other. (shrink)

Trotz der Verschiedenheit ihrer Ansätze1 sind Immanuel Kant und Peter Bieri übereinstimmend der Ansicht, dass wir unsere Absichten insofern frei wählen, als wir uns dabei an Gründen orientieren. Bieri beruft sich hierfür auf die Unverzichtbarkeit unseres Selbstverständnisses als handelnde Personen. Kant versucht darüber hinaus die Berechtigung dieses Selbstverständnisses in seiner Moralphilosophie nachzuweisen, nämlich mit unserer Fähigkeit, uns rein rational zu motivieren. Beide Autoren trennen unser Selbstverständnis strikt von der prinzipiell deterministischen Beschreibung des Menschen aus naturwissenschaftlicher Perspektive, versuchen aber zu zeigen, (...) dass diese beiden Auffassungen sich nicht widersprechen. Bieri erklärt, dass wir meinen, frei zu handeln, wenn unsere bewussten Absichten mit zu den Ursachen unseres Verhaltens gehören. Kant versucht zu zeigen, dass unsere Absichten nicht vollständig empirisch erklärt werden können, weil Überlegungen in sie eingehen, die nicht durch sinnliche Bedürfnisse oder Ereignisse motiviert sind. Im Anschluss an die Darstellung der Argumentation der Autoren soll die Kritik Bieris an einer rein naturwissenschaftlichen Betrachtung unseres Handels unter Berufung auf Kant verschärft werden: Es ist nicht nur aktuell und womöglich vorübergehend unmöglich, bei der Beschreibung unseres Handelns Überlegungen und Absichten durch neurophysiologische Beschreibungen zu ersetzen, sondern dies ist grundsätzlich ausgeschlossen, weil Gründe keineswegs nur die subjektive Innensicht individueller Gehirnzustände, sondern kommunikativ und historisch konstituiert sind. In Wirklichkeit beruht unsere Willensfreiheit auf sozial etablierten Normen. Abschießend soll gezeigt werden, dass das dargelegte Freiheitsverständnis in unserem Leben tatsächlich eine Rolle spielt. Dies wird durch Bezugnahme auf die Grundrechte des GG geschehen. (shrink)

[ROYAL INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY 2023 ESSAY PRIZE WINNER] I argue that the term ‘naturalism’ is so empty of meaning that it is not suitable for serious theorizing in philosophy. In particular, I argue that the question of whether or not some theory or thesis should count as naturalistic is an empty verbal dispute with no further theoretical significance. I also discuss naturalism construed as a methodological thesis and argue that any plausible version will collapse into triviality. Lastly, I briefly discuss (...) the idea that naturalism is not a thesis at all but rather a ‘stance’ and suggest that this too succumbs to the charge of emptiness. I conclude that we should stop talking about naturalism altogether. (shrink)

A key source of support for the view that challenging people’s beliefs about free will may undermine moral behavior is two classic studies by Vohs and Schooler (2008). These authors reported that exposure to certain prompts suggesting that free will is an illusion increased cheating behavior. In the present paper, we report several attempts to replicate this influential and widely cited work. Over a series of five studies (sample sizes of N = 162, N = 283, N = 268, N (...) = 804, N = 982) (four preregistered) we tested the relationship between (1) anti-free-will prompts and free will beliefs and (2) free will beliefs and immoral behavior. Our primary task was to closely replicate the findings from Vohs and Schooler (2008) using the same or highly similar manipulations and measurements as the ones used in their original studies. Our efforts were largely unsuccessful. We suggest that manipulating free will beliefs in a robust way is more difficult than has been implied by prior work, and that the proposed link with immoral behavior may not be as consistent as previous work suggests. (shrink)

This is an edited transcription of Thomas S. Kuhn’s “Does Knowledge ‘Grow’?”.

The Gamer’s Dilemma refers to the philosophical challenge of justifying the intuitive difference people seem to see between the moral permissibility of enacting virtual murder and the moral impermissibility of enacting virtual child molestation in video games (Luck Ethics and Information Technology, 1:31, 2009). Recently, Luck in Philosophia, 50:1287–1308, 2022 has argued that the Gamer’s Dilemma is actually an instance of a more general “paradox”, which he calls the “paradox of treating wrongdoing lightly”, and he proposes a graveness resolution to (...) this paradox. In response, we argue for four key claims. First, we accept Luck’s expansion of the Gamer’s Dilemma to be applicable to a wider set of media, but give a novel recasting of this in terms of the Paradox of Fictionally Going Too Far. Second, we develop a novel criticism of Luck in Philosophia, 50:1287–1308, 2022 graveness resolution to this broader paradox. Third, we argue that the Paradox of Fictionally Going Too Far helps to expose an implicit moralism in the Gamer’s Dilemma literature when compared to relevant nearby literatures about other forms of media. Fourth, we consider a range of non-moral, cultural and media conventions that plausibly help to dissolve the intuitive moral gap between non-sexual and sexual violence that is central to this paradox. (shrink)

A growing number of decision theorists have, in recent years, defended the view that rationality is permissive under risk: Different rational agents may be more or less risk-averse or risk-inclined. This can result in them making different choices under risk even if they value outcomes in exactly the same way. One pressing question that arises once we grant such permissiveness is what attitude to risk we should implement when choosing on behalf of other people. Are we permitted to implement any (...) of the rationally permissible risk attitudes, is there some specific risk attitude that is required when choosing for others, or are we required to defer to the risk attitudes of the people on whose behalf we are choosing? This article elaborates on this question, explains its wider practical and theoretical significance, provides an overview of existing answers, and explores how to go about providing a more systematic account of how to choose on behalf of others in risky contexts. (shrink)

Intuitively, many people seem to hold that engaging in acts of virtual murder in videogames is morally permissible, whereas engaging in acts of virtual child molestation is morally impermissible. The Gamer’s Dilemma (Luck in Ethics Inf Technol 11:31–36, 2009) challenges these intuitions by arguing that it is unclear whether there is a morally relevant difference between these two types of virtual actions. There are two main responses in the literature to this dilemma. First, attempts to resolve the dilemma by defending (...) an account of the relevant moral differences between virtual murder and virtual child molestation. Second, attempts to dissolve the dilemma by undermining the intuitions that ground it. In this paper, we argue that a narrow version of the Gamer’s Dilemma seems to survive attempts to resolve or dissolve it away entirely, since neither approach seems to be able to solve the dilemma for all cases. We thus provide a contextually sensitive version of the dilemma that more accurately tracks onto the intuitions of gamers. However, we also argue that the intuitions that ground the narrow version of the Dilemma may not have a moral foundation, and we put forward alternative non-moral normative foundations that seem to better account for the remaining intuitive difference between the two types of virtual actions. We also respond to proposed solutions to the Gamer’s Dilemma in novel ways and set out areas for future empirical work in this area. (shrink)

This paper challenges the widely held view that ‘good for’, ‘well-being’, and related terms express a distinctive evaluative concept of central importance for ethics and separate from ‘simply good’ as used by G. E. Moore and others. More specifically, it argues that there's no philosophically useful good-for or well-being concept that's neither merely descriptive in the sense of naturalistic nor reducible to ‘simply good’. The paper distinguishes two interpretations of the common claim that the value ‘good for’ expresses is distinctively (...) ‘subject-relative’. One concerns the ground of this value, or the properties that make something good for you; it says these must involve some relation to you. The other concerns the resulting value itself, or what supervenes on this ground; it says that too involves a relation. Neither interpretation, the paper argues, yields a significantly distinct evaluative concept. The ethically fundamental evaluative concept is just ‘simply good’. (shrink)

A good account of the agnostic attitude of Suspending Judgement should explain how it can be rendered more or less rational/justified according to the state of one's evidence – and one's relation to that evidence. I argue that the attitude of suspending judgement whether p constitutively involves having a belief; roughly, a belief that one cannot yet tell whether or not p. I show that a theory of suspending that treats it as a sui generis attitude, wholly distinct from belief, (...) struggles to account for how suspension of judgement can be rendered more or less rational (or irrational) by one's evidence. I also criticise the related idea that suspension essentially requires an 'Inquiring Attitude'. I show how a belief-based theory, in contrast, neatly accounts for the rational and epistemic features of suspending and so neatly accounts for why an agnostic has a genuine neutral opinion concerning the question whether p, as opposed to simply having no opinion. (shrink)

Typically, nudging is a technique for steering the choices of people without giving reasons or using enforcement. In benevolent cases, it is used when people are insufficiently responsive to reason. The nudger triggers automatic cognitive mechanisms – sometimes even biases – in smart ways in order to push irrational people in the right direction. Interestingly, this technique can also be applied to doxastic attitudes. Someone who is doxastically unresponsive to evidence can be nudged into forming true beliefs or doxastic attitudes (...) that are propositionally justified. When doxastic nudging uses non-rational mechanisms, the worry is that nudging cannot result in justified beliefs or knowledge, as the resulting doxastic attitudes lack the right kind of basis. In this paper, I will argue that given the right background views about knowledge, justified beliefs and the relevant processes, epistemic nudging is possible even in these cases. That is, all kinds of nudging can – in appropriate circumstances – produce justified beliefs or knowledge in the nudgee. (shrink)

Theories of free will are often measured against how well they capture everyday intuitions about free will. But what are these everyday intuitions, and what theoretical commitments do they express? Empirical methods have delivered mixed messages. In response, some free will theorists have developed error theories to undermine the credentials of countervailing intuitions. These efforts are predicated on the idea that people might misunderstand determinism in any of several ways. This paper sheds light on the comprehension problem. We first discuss (...) recent efforts to explain systematic errors in how people interpret determinism. Then, we present the alarming results of two new preregistered studies exploring three types of comprehension failure: (a) epiphenomenal bypassing, (b) fatalistic bypassing, and (c) indeterministic intrusion. Our findings suggest that misunderstanding runs deeper than others have supposed. This casts doubt on existing models of commonsense thinking about free will. Unless and until researchers properly control for the kinds of misunderstandings we identify, research on free will intuitions cannot shed light on whether ordinary thinking reflects commitments to compatibilism or incompatibilism. (shrink)

ليس بالتفكير نخلق العوالم، بل بفهم العالم نتعلم التفكير. "الرؤية الكونية" هو مصطلح يجب أن يعني مجموعة من الأسس التي تنبثق منها فهم منهجي للكون، ومكوناته كالحياة، والعالم الذي نعيش فيه، والطبيعة، والظواهر البشرية، وعلاقاتها. إنه، بالتالي، مجال من الفلسفة التحليلية يغذيه العلوم، وهدفه هو هذا المعرفة المجمعة والمستدامة معرفيًا عن كل ما نحن عليه ونحتويه، وما يحيط بنا، وما يرتبط بنا بأي شكل من الأشكال. إنه شيء قديم قدم الفكر البشري، وبالإضافة إلى استخدام عناصر من علم الكونيات العلمي، فإنه (...) يشمل كل شيء في الفلسفة والعلوم الذي يشير إلى الكون والحياة. الرؤية الكونية ليست مجموعة من الأفكار والفرضيات والافتراضات بل هي نظام قائم على الملاحظة والتحليل والدليل والتوضيح. لا تهدف أي رؤية كونية إلى التعريف أو التأسيس أو الاقتراح بل فقط إلى الفهم والتحليل والتفسير. كل منا يبني وينقل رؤيته الكونية طوال حياته، دون إنشاء أشكال، كخلفية لتفكيرنا وسلوكنا. لغويًا، قد يشتق مصطلح "الرؤية الكونية" من الألمانية، ويعادل مفهوم "Weltanschauung"، كما استخدمه عدة فلاسفة. ومع ذلك، فإن هذه العلاقة اللغوية غير قابلة للتطبيق لأنها تتعارض مع ما نقترحه كرؤية كونية. تشير هذه الكلمة الألمانية إلى رؤية واقعية قبل منطقية أو أولية، ذات سياق حدسي وبعيدة عن المعرفة النقدية التي لم تكن موجودة بعد في وقت صياغتها. بلا شك، تحتوي الرؤى الكونية، بالمعنى الذي نفهمها، وتستخدم هذه العناصر الأولية أو قبل المنطقية التي تشمل التاريخ واللاوعي الجماعي وكل النماذج التي نحملها. ومع ذلك، في المفهوم الذي نطبقه هنا، تتجاوز الرؤية الكونية هذا المحتوى بكثير، أولاً من خلال إخضاعه باستمرار للتفكير النقدي الحالي، وأخيرًا من خلال جعل التجربة التحليلية (وليس التفكير نفسه أو الحدس) كونها الفعلي. يعرض أنطونيو لوبيس اتساع هذا المحتوى: "الرؤى الكونية ليست نتاج الفكر. لا تنبع من الرغبة البسيطة في المعرفة. إن استيعاب الواقع هو لحظة مهمة في تكوينها، ولكن، مع ذلك، هي واحدة فقط. إنها تأتي من السلوك الحيوي، ومن تجربة تقييم الحياة، ومن هيكل كليتنا النفسية. إن رفع الحياة إلى الوعي في معرفة الواقع، وفي التقييم، وفي الواقع الإرادي هو العمل البطيء والشاق الذي قامت به الإنسانية في تطوير مفاهيم الحياة. (ديلتاي، 1992 [1911]: 120)"(1) في هذا العمل، نسعى إلى تحديد رؤية كونية تستند إلى الحقائق التي تقدمها العلوم اليوم. لا نقترح، في أي وقت، أن نقوم بالعلم؛ أو نظري الفلسفة، لكننا سنسعى دائمًا لأن ندعم بها أو، على الأقل، نحتمي بها من التشوهات المعرفية التي نحملها عادة. (shrink)

ليس بالتفكير نخلق العوالم، بل بفهم العالم نتعلم التفكير. "الرؤية الكونية" هو مصطلح يجب أن يعني مجموعة من الأسس التي تنبثق منها فهم منهجي للكون، ومكوناته كالحياة، والعالم الذي نعيش فيه، والطبيعة، والظواهر البشرية، وعلاقاتها. إنه، بالتالي، مجال من الفلسفة التحليلية يغذيه العلوم، وهدفه هو هذا المعرفة المجمعة والمستدامة معرفيًا عن كل ما نحن عليه ونحتويه، وما يحيط بنا، وما يرتبط بنا بأي شكل من الأشكال. إنه شيء قديم قدم الفكر البشري، وبالإضافة إلى استخدام عناصر من علم الكونيات العلمي، فإنه (...) يشمل كل شيء في الفلسفة والعلوم الذي يشير إلى الكون والحياة. الرؤية الكونية ليست مجموعة من الأفكار والفرضيات والافتراضات بل هي نظام قائم على الملاحظة والتحليل والدليل والتوضيح. لا تهدف أي رؤية كونية إلى التعريف أو التأسيس أو الاقتراح بل فقط إلى الفهم والتحليل والتفسير. كل منا يبني وينقل رؤيته الكونية طوال حياته، دون إنشاء أشكال، كخلفية لتفكيرنا وسلوكنا. لغويًا، قد يشتق مصطلح "الرؤية الكونية" من الألمانية، ويعادل مفهوم "Weltanschauung"، كما استخدمه عدة فلاسفة. ومع ذلك، فإن هذه العلاقة اللغوية غير قابلة للتطبيق لأنها تتعارض مع ما نقترحه كرؤية كونية. تشير هذه الكلمة الألمانية إلى رؤية واقعية قبل منطقية أو أولية، ذات سياق حدسي وبعيدة عن المعرفة النقدية التي لم تكن موجودة بعد في وقت صياغتها. بلا شك، تحتوي الرؤى الكونية، بالمعنى الذي نفهمها، وتستخدم هذه العناصر الأولية أو قبل المنطقية التي تشمل التاريخ واللاوعي الجماعي وكل النماذج التي نحملها. ومع ذلك، في المفهوم الذي نطبقه هنا، تتجاوز الرؤية الكونية هذا المحتوى بكثير، أولاً من خلال إخضاعه باستمرار للتفكير النقدي الحالي، وأخيرًا من خلال جعل التجربة التحليلية (وليس التفكير نفسه أو الحدس) كونها الفعلي. يعرض أنطونيو لوبيس اتساع هذا المحتوى: "الرؤى الكونية ليست نتاج الفكر. لا تنبع من الرغبة البسيطة في المعرفة. إن استيعاب الواقع هو لحظة مهمة في تكوينها، ولكن، مع ذلك، هي واحدة فقط. إنها تأتي من السلوك الحيوي، ومن تجربة تقييم الحياة، ومن هيكل كليتنا النفسية. إن رفع الحياة إلى الوعي في معرفة الواقع، وفي التقييم، وفي الواقع الإرادي هو العمل البطيء والشاق الذي قامت به الإنسانية في تطوير مفاهيم الحياة. (ديلتاي، 1992 [1911]: 120)"(1) في هذا العمل، نسعى إلى تحديد رؤية كونية تستند إلى الحقائق التي تقدمها العلوم اليوم. لا نقترح، في أي وقت، أن نقوم بالعلم؛ أو نظري الفلسفة، لكننا سنسعى دائمًا لأن ندعم بها أو، على الأقل، نحتمي بها من التشوهات المعرفية التي نحملها عادة. (shrink)

हम सोच कर दुनिया नहीं बनाते। दुनिया को समझ कर हम सोचना सीखते हैं। कॉस्मोविज़न एक ऐसा शब्द है जिसका मतलब नींव का एक समूह होना चाहिए जिससे ब्रह्मांड, जीवन के रूप में इसके घटकों, जिस दुनिया में हम रहते हैं, प्रकृति, मानवीय घटनाओं और उनके संबंधों की एक व्यवस्थित समझ उभरती है। इसलिए, यह विज्ञान द्वारा पोषित विश्लेषणात्मक दर्शन का एक क्षेत्र है, जिसका उद्देश्य हम जो हैं और जो हमारे चारों ओर है, और जो किसी भी तरह से (...) हमसे संबंधित है, उसके बारे में यह एकत्रित और ज्ञानमीमांसीय रूप से स्थायी ज्ञान है। यह मानव विचार जितना ही पुराना है, और वैज्ञानिक ब्रह्मांड विज्ञान के तत्वों का उपयोग करने के अलावा, यह दर्शन और विज्ञान में ब्रह्मांड और जीवन को संदर्भित करने वाली हर चीज को शामिल करता है। एक कॉस्मोविज़न विचारों, परिकल्पनाओं और मान्यताओं का एक समूह नहीं है, बल्कि अवलोकन, विश्लेषण, साक्ष्य और प्रदर्शन पर आधारित एक प्रणाली है। कोई भी कॉस्मोविज़न परिभाषित करने, स्थापित करने या प्रस्तावित करने का इरादा नहीं रखता है, बल्कि केवल समझने, विश्लेषण करने और व्याख्या करने का इरादा रखता है। हममें से प्रत्येक व्यक्ति अपने सोच और व्यवहार के लिए पृष्ठभूमि के रूप में, रूपों को स्थापित किए बिना, जीवन भर अपने कॉस्मोविज़न का निर्माण और परिवहन करता है। भाषाई रूप से, "कॉस्मोविज़न" शब्द जर्मन से लिया गया है, जो कई दार्शनिकों द्वारा इस्तेमाल किए गए "वेल्टनशाउंग" की अवधारणा के बराबर है। हालाँकि, यह भाषाई संबंध लागू नहीं होता है क्योंकि यह हमारे द्वारा प्रस्तावित ब्रह्मांड-दृष्टि के विपरीत है। यह जर्मन शब्द वास्तविकता के एक पूर्व-तार्किक या प्रोटो-प्रयोगात्मक दृष्टिकोण को संदर्भित करता है, जिसमें एक सहज संदर्भ होता है और आलोचनात्मक ज्ञान से बहुत दूर होता है जो इसके निर्माण के समय भी अस्तित्व में नहीं था। निस्संदेह, ब्रह्मांड-दृष्टि, जिस अर्थ में हम उन्हें समझते हैं, इन प्रोटो-प्रयोगात्मक या पूर्व-तार्किक तत्वों को समाहित करता है और उनका उपयोग करता है जिसमें इतिहास, सामूहिक अचेतन और हमारे द्वारा धारण किए जाने वाले सभी मूलरूप शामिल हैं। हालाँकि, जिस अवधारणा को हम यहाँ लागू करते हैं, उसमें ब्रह्मांड-दृष्टि इस सामग्री से बहुत आगे निकल जाती है, सबसे पहले इसे लगातार वर्तमान आलोचनात्मक सोच के अधीन करके, और अंत में विश्लेषणात्मक अनुभव (और न कि विचार या अंतर्ज्ञान) को अपना वास्तविक ब्रह्मांड बनाकर। एंटोनियो लोपेस इस विषय-वस्तु की व्यापकता को उजागर करते हैं: "ब्रह्मांडीय दर्शन विचार की उपज नहीं हैं। वे जानने की सरल इच्छा से उत्पन्न नहीं होते हैं। वास्तविकता की समझ इसकी संरचना में एक महत्वपूर्ण क्षण है, लेकिन फिर भी, यह केवल एक है। यह जीवन के मूल्यांकन के अनुभव से, और हमारी मानसिक समग्रता की संरचना से, जीवन को वास्तविकता के ज्ञान में, मूल्यांकन में, और इच्छाधारी वास्तविकता में चेतना तक ऊपर उठाना वह धीमा और कठिन कार्य है जो मानवता ने जीवन की अवधारणाओं के विकास में किया है।" -/- . (shrink)

This book offers a much-needed new political theory of an old phenomenon. The last decade alone has marked the highest number of migrations in recorded history. Constrained by environmental, economic, and political instability, scores of people are on the move. But other sorts of changes—from global tourism to undocumented labor—have led to the fact that to some extent, we are all becoming migrants. The migrant has become the political figure of our time. Rather than viewing migration as the exception to (...) the rule of political fixity and citizenship, Thomas Nail reinterprets the history of political power from the perspective of the movement that defines the migrant in the first place. Applying his "kinopolitics" to several major historical conditions and figures of migration, he provides fresh tools for the analysis of contemporary migration. (shrink)

Issues of reliability are claiming center-stage in the epistemology of machine learning. This paper unifies different branches in the literature and points to promising research directions, whilst also providing an accessible introduction to key concepts in statistics and machine learning – as far as they are concerned with reliability.